

Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP78B05703A00010003
MEMORANDUM FOR:

6 Aug '70.

[Redacted]

(By safe hand of

[Redacted])

Thanks. This really
doesn't cover the kinds
of handling questions we
are currently wrestling
with.

(DATE)

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

DIAS

Howard -

*- Note my question marks
reflecting my doubts &
disagreements. For that
reason, I'd prefer this to
be for your reading only.*



31 July 70

(DATE)

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TOP SECRET

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1 May 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Requirements and Reporting in [REDACTED]

1. A group of NPIC officers adjourned to [REDACTED] during the period 20-23 April 1970 to consider the question - "What changes are required in requirements and reporting in order to exploit [REDACTED] without substantial increases in NPIC resources?" Included in the group [REDACTED]

2. By utilizing the "building block" approach, we developed a concept of operation and several organizational concepts designed to accomplish what we consider to be the primary mission of the Center.

3. The primary mission of NPIC was stated as: To insure the fullest exploitation of imagery producing collection systems consistent with national needs and objectives. Within this mission:

a. NPIC has primary responsibility for all initial, time dominated, exploitation and reporting of designated national collection systems, in response to national exploitation requirements. NPIC is also responsible for exploiting such other collection systems that may also relate to national intelligence problems.

b. NPIC is responsible for in-depth analysis and reporting of selected targets and/or subjects which relate to national intelligence problems.

4. We also considered that NPIC has a secondary mission. This secondary mission is: To provide to other imagery exploitation organizations certain "services of common concern" that do not conflict with the accomplishment of the primary mission. Within this mission the Center should:

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SUBJECT: Requirements and Reporting in []

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a. Establish and maintain a comprehensive base of imagery exploitation related information in support of national intelligence production.

b. Establish and maintain a capability to conduct independent research and develop exploitation related equipments in support of the national exploitation process.

c. Provide reproduction and reference service to other imagery exploitation organizations engaged in the national imagery exploitation effort.

d. Support the national imagery collection effort by the provision of that level of technical evaluation services necessary to insure the effective operation and maintenance of a national reconnaissance program.

5. In order to accomplish these missions, we developed a concept of operation which we feel is most responsive to the national intelligence needs. The outline of this concept is as follows - Key points are underlined:

A. Imagery Exploitation

1. Mission Exploitation

a. Readout of highest priority national intelligence targets or subjects.

b. Search for and determination of significant changes to other known national intelligence targets or subjects.

c. Search for new targets of national intelligence significance.

d. Feedback of that information required by the operators of collection systems in order to effectively program subsequent coverage. (We seriously doubt that NPIC has an indexing requirement).

2. Mission Exploitation Reporting

a. Highest priority national intelligence targets or subjects would be reported daily in hard copy and cable form. The level of information reported should be limited to and consistent with or related to the intelligence problem that causes it to be a high priority target.

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b. Significant changes to known targets and new targets of national intelligence significance will be reported weekly in hard copy form. Changes to known targets and new targets of a significance comparable to the highest priority will be reported daily. Level of information should be limited to describing significance.

c. Operational feedback would be reported in a limited, special purpose, informal form.

3. In-Depth Exploitation

a. Analysis of time-dominated, limited scope exploitation of subjects directly related to national intelligence production.

b. Exploitation on a limited scope, non-time dominated basis of subjects of national intelligence production interest.

c. In-depth comprehensive analysis of national intelligence related subjects.

4. In-Depth Exploitation Reporting

a. Reporting of time-dominated, limited scope analysis will be accomplished on an immediate or daily basis in an economical hard copy format.

b. Limited-scope, non-time dominated analysis will be reported on a monthly basis in a single hard copy.

c. In-depth comprehensive exploitation will be reported on a quarterly basis in hard copy form.

7. It was the intention of the group that a set of operational procedures be developed which would provide greater detail on each aspect of the concept of operation. These procedures would then serve as the supervisors guidelines for implementing the concept. Obviously these procedures would include a workable definition of the key points of the operational concept. However, it quickly became apparent that such procedures depended upon which imagery exploitation organizational concept was adopted. At least three organizational concepts were proposed and are outlined below.

a. The first concept places the emphasis upon geographic areas with the analyst in these areas responsible for first- and second-phase interpretation in nearly all functional categories of intelligence and limited third-phase responsibility in military intelligence areas. There would be three geographic areas and one functional area which would have limited first- and second-phase responsibility and total third-phase responsibility in the strategic weapons areas.

b. The second concept of organization has one geographic area and three functional areas. The geographic area would only be responsible for the mission scan. It would not have to "write up" any targets, except for most new ones it would find. The functional areas (missiles, scientific, and military) would be responsible for all exploitation and reporting except for the mission scan responsibility.

c. The third concept would have two major areas which are compatible with the primary mission, i.e., mission exploitation and in-depth exploitation. The mission exploitation unit would be responsible for all aspects of mission exploitation and reporting as described in the concept of operation. The in-depth unit would accomplish that exploitation and reporting included in the in-depth portion of the concept of operation. This organizational approach when coupled with the time-phased concept of reporting has obvious implications on the supportive elements of the Center.

8. In addition to defining a mission, developing a concept of operation, and discussing three organizational concepts, the group covered a wide range of subjects and ideas relative to requirements and reporting. Many of these ideas and thoughts would probably be incorporated into the detailed operational procedures once a concept of operation was adopted. A number of problem areas, such as, the WWIPR, the data base, and indexing and operational feedback would also have to be resolved upon the adoption of an operational concept and development of an organizational concept.

[Redacted]
Executive Officer, PPBS

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